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Abstract 
The most common way of dealing with the fear of death is denying death. Such denial can take two 
and only two forms: strategy 1 denies the finality of death; strategy 2 denies the reality of the dying 
subject. Most religions opt for strategy 1, but Buddhism seems to be an example of the 2nd. All 
variants of strategy 1 fail, however, and a closer look at the main Buddhist argument reveals that 
Buddhism in fact does not follow strategy 2. Moreover, there is no other theory that does, and 
neither can there be. This means that there is no tenable theory that denies death. There may be no 
universally psychologically acceptable alternative, however, which would mean that if denying 
death is incoherent, this is an unavoidable incoherence. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The influence of death and how we deal with it on our lives can hardly be 
overstated. To a large extent, we live our lives in the shadow of death, in a 
shadow created by fear and denial. There is no fear as deep and pervasive as the 
fear of death. Everyone fears death, but most of us are able to force this fear into 
the background, into a slumber from which it awakes only occasionally. 
Religion is the most important (but not the only) means of establishing this 
slumber; it is, as Marx wrote, “the opium of the people”:
1
 an anxiolytic, or a 
painkiller. According to Ernest Becker (1973), controlling the fear of death is the 
primary purpose of religion (and heroism), and religion achieves this by denying 
death: religion is a symbolic system of death denial. 
Denying death is denying that I die – that is, denying the proposition that 
everything that is me will (one day) cease to be, in which “everything” has 
existential import. In more formal terms (to minimize ambiguity), the claim that 
I will someday die amounts to the following: 
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[D] ∀ x [ x is me → x will cease to be ] ∧ ∃  x [ x is me ] ,2 
 
and denying death, therefore, is denying/rejecting [D]. Given that [D] is a 
conjunction, there are three options for its denial: rejecting the first conjunct, 
rejecting the second, or rejecting both. Strategy 1 rejects the first conjunct:  
 
[S1] ∃  x [ x is me ∧ ¬ ( x will cease to be ) ] .3 
 
Perhaps, it will be technologically possible in the future to transfer 
someone’s mind to a computer or robot (or something else) and in that way 
make immortality a reality, but even though that hypothetical situation could 
conform to [S1] if certain further preconditions are met, it is not an example of 
denying death as intended here. The key difference is that such technological 
immortality would make [S1] true, while the essence of strategy 1 death denial is 
the claim that [S1] is already true (without any technological aid). For that 
reason I will further ignore the possibility (if it is a possibility indeed) of future 
technological immortality in this paper. 
Negating the second conjunct in [D] has the result that the first conjunct 
fails to refer to anything and becomes irrelevant, regardless of whether it is 
negated or affirmed. For that reason, it makes no difference in this case whether 
one just rejects the second conjunct in [D] or both. Strategy 2, therefore, simply 
negates the second conjunct (and ignores or discards the first): 
 
[S2] ∃¬   x [ x is me ] . 
 
This exhausts the options. There are logically no other denials of [D] besides 
[S1] and [S2], and consequently, there are no other ways of denying death. 
Less formally, the difference between these two strategies is that the first 
                                           
2 This formalization leaves open whether “is me” is a predicate or numerical identity (=) with a 
∃constant “me”. Perhaps, a more obvious formalization of the proposition that “I die” seems to be   x 
[ x is me ∧ x will cease to be ], but that leaves open the possibility that there is something else that is 
also me that will not cease to be in case of the predicate interpretation, and thus misses the key point 
about the proposition that “I die”: i.e. that nothing that is me survives. 
3 ∀In steps: [1] negation of the first conjunct in [D]: ¬  x [ x is me → x will cease to be ]. [1] is 
∃equivalent to [2]   x ¬ [ x is me ∧ x will cease to be ]. The first conjunct in [2] cannot be negated 
because only ∃the first conjunct in [D] is rejected and   x [ x is me ] is thus (implicitly) affirmed. 
Therefore, [2] is equivalent to [S1]. 
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and most common strategy denies the verb in “I die”, while the second denies 
the subject, “I”. The first asserts that I do not really die, that I somehow 
“survive” death. The second asserts that there really is no “I” that dies, that I do 
not really exist anyway. The first strategy is that of the monotheistic religions, 
but of most other religions as well. The second strategy seems to be that of 
Buddhism (with the exception of popular Pure Land Buddhism and derivatives, 
which opt for the first strategy instead) and has apparent parallels in the thought 
of a few contemporary Western philosophers, most notably Derek Parfit (1984).
4
 
Superficially, Mark Johnston’s death-denying argument in Surviving Death 
(2010) may seem to follow neither strategy 1 nor strategy 2, but to be a third 
strategy that combines elements of both, suggesting that there are further options 
after all, but this is not the case. Johnston’s argument consists of two steps: the 
first rejects a fixed and thick “I” that dies, as in strategy 2; the second allows for 
a reconfiguration of whatever is left of the dying subject into something that 
does not die, ending up with a variant of strategy 1. Hence, Johnston indeed uses 
arguments typical of (what seems to be) strategy 2, but does so in the context of 
a strategy 1 argument. 
Johnston’s view will be discussed in section 4. Before that, section 2 briefly 
discusses and rejects the other variants of strategy 1 and section 3 introduces 
strategy 2. Buddhism as an apparent variant of strategy 2 and the tenability of 
[S2] in general are discussed in section 5. The main claim of this paper is that 
because strategy 1 fails and because there are no, and can be no examples of 
strategy 2, there is no viable theory that denies death. Section 6 argues that there 
may be no real, universally psychologically acceptable alternative to denial, 
however, and therefore, that if denying death is incoherent, this may be a 
(socially) unavoidable incoherence. The final section 7 changes the focus to why 
and what this matters. 
 
2. Strategy 1: Survival Theories 
 
Theories following strategy 1 assert [S1], or in less formal terms: that there 
                                           
4 If reincarnation is understood as involving a soul, then Buddhism would follow strategy 1. However, 
the Buddhist understanding of reincarnation is purely causal and does not involve any transmigrating 
substance (although it seems that interpretations differ on this point). Moreover, it can be argued that 
reincarnation is not an essential element of Buddhism, but merely part of the common sense context 
within which it developed (e.g. Siderits 2007, ch. 2). In any case, reincarnation (if true, of course) is 
not a “solution” for the fear of death, but a cause of its endless repetition, life after life. 
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is something that is me and that (in some relevant sense) survives after 
biological death. Such theories can, therefore, be called “survival theories”. 
What distinguishes different survival theories is the nature of the surviving 
subject, the x in [S1]. The name given to that subject, on the other hand, is 
mostly irrelevant; it does not matter whether it is called soul, spirit, true self, 
essence, ātman, ka, or anything else. In words and diagram, the following shows 
the options for the nature of the surviving subject: 
 
The surviving subject 
[1] is something material/physical; or 
[2] is not something material/physical, but 
[2a] *supervenes on something material/physical but 
 does not exist independently thereof, and 
[2a'] the *subvenient is the body, or 
[2a''] the *subvenient is something else than the body; 
 or 
[2b] is something immaterial/non-physical and exists independently, and 
[2b'] there is a material/physical world with material/physical bodies, or 
[2b''] there is no material/physical world. 
 
Supervenience and its counterpart subvenience are marked * to note that 
they should be understood broadly here: as including related notions of 
ontological dependence. Most contemporary theories on the metaphysics of 
mind (including functionalism and varieties of property dualism such as 
emergentism and anomalous monism) postulate a supervenient mind in this 
broad sense. Any extension of such a theory arguing for a surviving mind would, 
therefore, be an example of [2a']. 
The main dividing line between kinds of survival theories is that between 
physicalism or materialism (broadly understood) and antiphysicalism. 
Physicalists opt for [1] or one of the two variants of [2a]; antiphysicalists opt for 
one of the two variants of [2b], that is, for either [2b'] substance dualism or [2b''] 
idealism. Historically, substance dualism and idealism have been the dominant 
survival theories. However, idealist and dualist survival theories inherit all the 
problems of idealism and dualism in general: the first tends to collapse into 
solipsism and the second cannot explain interaction between the immaterial soul 
(etc.) and the material body.  
1 2 
2a 2b
2b' 2b''2a' 2a'' 
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It should be noted that if mind and soul are assumed to be different “things”, 
soul - body interaction is not necessarily the same as mind - body interaction, 
and that a substance dualist with regards to the soul can be a materialist with 
regards to the mind. Nevertheless, there must be some interaction between 
matter/body and soul if the soul is to reflect somehow (the effects of) the 
worldly (i.e. materially) (mis-) adventures of its associated body, and since that 
is always (perhaps even necessarily) assumed in dualist survival theories, soul - 
body dualism suffers from the same interaction problem as mind - body dualism.  
Throughout history there have been various attempts to save idealism and 
substance dualism from solipsism and the interaction problem respectively, but I 
will make no effort to discuss these. (They can be found in any introductory 
textbook on the philosophy of mind.) The contemporary consensus among 
philosophers is that these rescue attempts fail and that idealism and substance 
dualism are, therefore, untenable. For that reason, repeating all the arguments 
here (which would require more space than available anyway) seems 
unnecessary. Instead, I’ll take the shortcut to the conclusion that [2b] fails. 
There is one attempt to save substance dualism that deserves some attention, 
however, not because philosophers consider it less flawed than the others (rather 
in the contrary), but because it seems to be very common among 
non-philosophers. The idea depends on a rejection of the material - immaterial 
dichotomy and the supposition of a third option, which I shall call 
“quasi-material”. According to “quasi-materialism” we have quasi-material 
souls (etc.), which seems to imply that this option (if it is one) takes an 
intermediate position between [1] and [2b']. The quasi-material soul does 
interact with the material world in some way, which solves the interaction 
problem, but is not something that has properties that can be measured with the 
tools and instruments of (current) physics. However, regardless of the latter 
limitation, if there is such a quasi-material soul that interacts with the material 
world, then there must be occasions, circumstances, or experiments in which 
either that interaction or the soul itself can be observed (or abduced at least). If 
there is a quasi-material soul, there must be some kind of empirical evidence for 
its existence. There is none.
5
 
Furthermore, the notion of “quasi-materiality” is entirely mysterious and 
explanatory redundant. (How does one even make sense of the notion of 
                                           
5 Contrary to popular belief, hallucinations of an oxygen-deprived brain are not visions of the afterlife. 
(See, for example, Mobbs & Watt 2011, or the first part of chapter 2 of Johnston 2010.) 
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“quasi-materiality” without collapsing quasi-materialism either into materialism 
or substance-dualism?) That this doesn’t automatically disqualify the idea 
(among non-philosophers) is because its appeal does not depend on explanatory 
power, but on “life-saving” power: on the promise of an afterlife, of surviving 
death as one’s immortal soul. That substance dualism (and to a lesser extent also 
idealism) has been dominant within philosophy for so long despite its (obvious) 
problems, and that there have been so many attempts to save it, is (at least) 
partly for the same reason. Philosophers are not immune for the psychological 
need of a fear-repressing belief in survival either. (And unfortunately, this need 
can make rational discussion of the topic very difficult.) 
If [2b] fails and we cannot make sense of an intermediate between [1] and 
[2b'], then there is no viable (or remotely plausible, at least) theory of an 
immaterial or quasi-material “soul”, which leaves physicalism/materialism – 
that is, [1] and [2a] – as the only alternative. 
In [1] the surviving subject is the body or a part thereof; in [2a'] it 
*supervenes thereon and has, therefore, no independent existence. Consequently, 
the difference between [1] and [2a'] is irrelevant for survival: in both, my 
survival depends on the survival of my body or some part thereof (such as the 
brain). Nevertheless, thought experiments about body swapping versus mind 
swapping reveal that we identify with our minds rather than our bodies, which 
indicates that [1] is considerably less plausible than [2a']. In either case, bodily 
survival theories, such as Christian materialism (I’m not aware of anything 
similar in other religions), supposing God as “corpse snatcher” or something 
similar, are exceedingly absurd, and seem more desperate attempts at 
fear-repressing self-delusion even than the belief in an immortal soul. Mark 
Johnston does an excellent job at taking these theories seriously and showing 
them to be incoherent in the first chapter of Surviving Death (2010). 
Table 1 lists the options for strategy 1 (the survival theory) and summarizes 
their main problems. In all four cases discussed above, these problems (alone, or 
in combination with further problems not mentioned here) are fatal, I think. 
There is, however, one further option that has not been discussed yet: [2a'']. The 
surviving subject could be some kind of (epi-) phenomenon that supervenes, or 
depends for its existence on some surviving material being(s) other than the 
body. Mark Johnston (2010) argues for something like this, but his theory 
depends on arguments that are more typical for what seems to be strategy 2. For 
that reason, Johnston’s theory, and other options for supervening survivors (i.e. 
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2a''), will be discussed (in section 4) after a brief introduction into “I” denial. 
 
Table 1: Variants of strategy 1 and their problems 
survival theory surviving subject (x in S1) problem(s) 
[2b'']: idealism immaterial soul (etc.) solipsism 
[2b']: substance dualism immaterial soul (etc.) 
mind/soul - body 
interaction 
between [1] and [2b']: 
“quasi-materialism” 
quasi-material soul (etc.) 
obscurity and lack of 
evidence 
[1] or [2a']: physicalism / 
materialism 
body (or something 
*supervening thereon)  
incoherence 
(Johnston 2010, ch. 1)
[2a'']  see section 4 
 
3. Strategy 2: Denying the “I” 
 
Strategy 2 denies the dying subject, it claims that – in some relevant sense – 
there is no “I” dying. Or, more formally, it rejects the second conjunct in [D] 
after which the first is discarded because it fails to refer to anything and is, 
therefore, irrelevant.  
The standard argument for the idea that there is no self/person/“I” (in some 
relevant sense) is familiar from Hume (1739) or early Buddhist literature:
6
 there 
is no single part or element of a self (“I”) or person that must remain the same 
for that self/person to count as the same person. Therefore, there is no self, or 
selves are just bundles of experiences, or mere “convenient designators”, 
conventions, phenomena, and so forth. Of course, there are important 
differences between variants of this basic idea, but it is what they have in 
common what matters here: the self/person/“I”/dying subject is in some relevant 
sense not (sufficiently) real. What follows from this differs between Buddhism 
and Mark Johnston, for example, but before discussing implications, we need 
some further clarification of the basic idea. 
Denying the “I” starts with the observation that there is no single part or 
element of me that has remained the same (and will remain the same) 
throughout my life history. In other words, there is nothing, no (single) “thing” 
                                           
6 See, for example, The Questions of King Milinda (Milinda Panha; approx. 100 BCE). 
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that defines and identifies me, no essential me. This observation, however, is not 
entirely uncontroversial, but its rejection would require the identification of 
some plausible self-essence, and there doesn’t seem to be a candidate. What 
could my (self-) defining essence be? Not my immaterial soul (etc.), because – 
as we have seen in the previous section – I don’t have one, and not anything 
material either, because indeed, there is no material part of me that remained the 
same (and/or will remain the same) throughout my life. Some structural and 
genetic properties, such as my genetic code or my birth date, will remain the 
same throughout my life, on the other hand; but I would share my genes with my 
identical twin if I had one, and those, therefore, cannot essentially identify me; 
and the idea that I am my birth date is obviously absurd. Then what’s left? 
“Nothing,” is the answer to that question, confirming Hume’s or the Buddha’s 
observation. I have no essence, I am merely a bundle of experiences (Hume 
1739). 
However, if selves/persons are mere bundles of experiences, then what ties 
those bundles together (into the phenomenal/conventional selves, thus forming 
them); what makes them bundles rather than mere random collections? Locke’s 
(1690) answer to that or a similar question was that “nothing but consciousness 
can unite remote existences into the same person” (II.xxvii.23).
7
 
“Consciousness” here refers to memory: it is memory of past experiences that 
ties a bundle of experiences together into a self/person. The Buddhist answer is 
causality: there is a causal series of conscious experiences, each lasting only for 
a moment, then disappearing, but not before causing a replacement to come into 
existence.
8
 Locke’s memory/consciousness theory and the Buddhist causal 
chain theory can be combined into the idea that it is the causal chain of 
experiences and memories thereof that ties together the bundle. The best known 
elaboration of more or less this idea is that by Derek Parfit in (1984) Reasons 
and Persons. According to Parfit, it is “psychological continuity and 
connectedness” that determines personal identity. 
While in Locke’s theory, there is an element of the self that remains, 
memories; in Parfit’s theory (and in the Buddhist theory), there is nothing that 
remains: there is no single memory (or other part) that me-30-years-ago and 
                                           
7 This “answer” was given before Hume suggested his bundle theory. Hence, it was not an “answer” 
to Hume specifically. 
8 There is a vast literature on the Buddhist theory (or theories) of personal identity (as there is on 
many other aspects of Buddhist philosophy). For an introduction, see Siderits (2007), chapter 3. 
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me-now (necessarily) share, but there is a causal chain of intermediate stages, 
collections of memories and other parts, between me-then and me-now, and it is 
this causal chain, this psychological continuity and connectedness, that makes 
me-then and me-now the same person. Still, the fact that there is nothing, no 
thing (i.e. no single element that remained the same) that determines my identity, 
means that ultimately there is no “I”, no self, no person. “Person” is a forensic 
term according to Locke (II.xxvii.26), a mere “convenient designator” according 
to Buddhist philosophy. Daniel Dennett (1992) made a similar point when he 
wrote that a self is “a theorist’s fiction” similar to a center of gravity: it is a 
useful concept for explanation but does not refer to some kind of (really 
existing) thing or entity. Rather, selves are narratively constructed: a self is a 
“center of narrative gravity”.
9
 
 
4. Johnston’s Escape 
 
In Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death (2010), the idea of the self as a center 
of narrative gravity is echoed in his understanding of consciousness as “an arena 
with some person at the phenomenological center” (p. 237) and the person as 
that what is at the center of the arena. Rather than a bundle of thoughts and 
experiences, the person is (at) the center of an arena of thoughts and 
experiences. Johnston rejects psychological continuity as a necessary personal 
identity condition, which opens up a new possibility for surviving death, which I 
shall call “Johnston’s escape”. Johnston’s argument is complex, but can be 
summarized in the following four steps. 
 
[J1] There is no external criterion for judging competing personal identity 
conditions (that is, no neutral criterion outside all positions on the matter), 
and consequently, an “evenhanded” treatment is necessary; that is, an 
approach that assumes that each position (each identity condition) is right 
on its own terms. 
[J2] Because relativism is no option, [J1] can only mean that personal identity 
is a disposition: we are disposed to construct personal identity in a certain 
way, and therefore believe that we can remain the same person throughout 
certain kinds of events, while other kinds of events would result in 
                                           
9 The idea that the self is constructed through narrative (the stories we tell of and to ourselves) has 
been developed further in Narrative Identity Theory within personality psychology. 
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personal death. 
[J3] The radical reversal. While according to the “naive” view, 
“future-directed concern” (concern for the well-being (etc.) of some future 
person) is derived from personal identity, the dispositional view changes 
this around.
10
 It is not the case that I am concerned about future person x 
because he is me (as in the “naive” view), but future person(s) x is me 
because I am (genuinely!) concerned about him/her/them. In other words, 
personal identity depends on genuine (!) future-directed concern, not the 
other way around. This is what Johnston calls the “radical reversal”. 
[J4] Johnston’s escape. From [J3] follows that with the right disposition, the 
right future-directed concern, we are immortal. Someone who is 
(genuinely!) concerned about the future of the whole of mankind would 
“quite literally, live on in the onward rush of humankind”, and therefore, 
“the good, that is the really good, survive death” (p. 296). 
 
Johnston’s may seem to be an attractive view, but there are problems in 
several of the steps of the argument supporting it. An obvious problem for [J4] is 
that one does not need to identify with the whole of mankind to survive – if the 
rest of the argument is sound – but with anything that is likely to survive: one’s 
nation, for example, will do just as well, which would lead to the conclusion that 
some nationalists also survive death.
11
 Furthermore, if one hopes to conquer the 
terror of death by putting one’s cards on the whole of mankind, solar death must 
be as terrifying a prospect as personal death for anyone else. For the argument to 
work as a fear-repressing denial of death, it needs an identification with 
something absolutely immortal, and there doesn’t seem to be anything available. 
It is unlikely, however, that we’ll even get to [J4]. The personal identity 
theories (theories on the conditions for personal survival throughout various 
more or less exotic events) that Johnston discusses in his argument for 
“evenhanded treatment” – that is, for [J1] – can all be described as psychological 
continuity plus further restrictions (or lacking those). In comparing and 
evaluating these theories, Johnston takes them as unanalyzable wholes, but all 
                                           
10 “Whereas the naive intuitive view is that the holding of the relation of personal identity 
independently justifies certain future-oriented dispositions, the radical reversal will have it that, within 
certain limits, those dispositions make it the case that one or another restriction of identity counts as 
personal identity for a given community!” (p. 274) 
11 I seem to remember that someone else made this point before, but I have been unable to find a 
source. 
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that needs judgment or evaluation is what is different between them, not what 
they share; and (lacking external judgment criteria) an “evenhanded treatment” 
is, therefore, needed only for the evaluation of those differences. In other words, 
if the reasoning in [J2] is accepted, then [J1] and [J2] together lead to the 
conclusion that those additional criteria on top of the shared criterion of 
psychological continuity are dispositional, but not that all identity conditions are 
dispositional; specifically, the argument does not lead to the rejection of the 
criterion of psychological continuity. However, for [J3] and [J4] to work, 
Johnston needs complete dispositionality, and consequently, [J4] does not 
follow. 
Furthermore, Johnston’s argument for [J3] also involves the rejection of the 
psychological continuity criterion, but this argument is flawed. He presents his 
case by means of the following thought experiment: 
 
Alzheimer’s has begun to set in, but I am told that the effective treatment 
that will more than restore my memory is more than a year away. By that 
time I will have lost all the memories that support the moorings of this 
individual personality. The treatment (...) will restore my capacity to 
remember but not my memories. I can get one with a practical form of life 
after my recovery, but it will not be this form of life. (...) this individual 
personality will be lost. (...) Even so, the kind of future-directed concern 
that goes with personal identity does get engaged here. Anticipating all 
this, it would be natural for me to now plan around the anticipatable needs 
of that new individual personality. (pp. 276-7) 
 
Whether this works as an argument for the “radical reversal” and against the 
psychological continuity criterion depends on whether and why it is “natural” 
for me to treat this post-Alzheimer-treatment person as a continuant of me, 
regardless of whether it is a continuant of me. If the “radical reversal” is sound, 
then because of my future-directed concern this future person would be me, 
while according to the psychological continuity criterion, it would not be me, 
but assuming either one of the two would be begging the question. 
There are (at least) two reasons why this thought experiment fails as an 
argument for the “radical reversal” (and against the psychological continuity 
criterion). Firstly, I am in a special position with regards to the interests of the 
post-Alzheimer-treatment person because of various non-personality-bound 
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continuities (such as continuities of property and other (legal) rights and duties), 
and I know this and can anticipate that this post-Alzheimer-treatment person 
can/will know this as well. This, combined with at least minimal empathy for the 
post-Alzheimer-treatment person, is sufficient to explain why I would “plan” for 
the future person (or why it is “natural” to do so).
12
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the case is not intuitively 
comprehensible because it asks us to imagine the unimaginable. We can imagine 
to be somewhere else, sometime else, maybe even someone else,
13
 but it is 
fundamentally impossible (perhaps even self-contradictory) to image not to be. 
Johnston pumps for intuition in an area where our intuitions can only be wrong. 
We cannot understand non-being of this present being (“this form of life”), and 
that is exactly what is the case here. Regardless of whether this future being is 
the same person (that is what the argument is supposed to establish), it is not 
me-now (the present self; “this form of life”) or a psychological continuant 
thereof. Intuitively, we can only think of this future being as somehow 
continuing at least part of the present self; we do not – are not even able to – 
imagine the scenario of complete elimination of our present selves. We 
automatically assume that at least something is preserved (because there is no 
other option; because imagination involves putting our present selves in some 
other situation), and it is that “something” that we intuitively care for. Of course, 
this intuition is wrong, there is no psychological continuity in the scenario, but it 
strengthens empathy with the post-Alzheimer-treatment person and thus 
reinforces the first reason. 
While both these reasons in themselves explain the “naturality” of 
“future-directed concern” without assuming (or creating) personal identity, and 
thus without rejecting the psychological continuity criterion, the two reasons 
together make it rather difficult to avoid future-directed concern for the 
post-Alzheimer-treatment person, but that proves or disproves nothing. 
Johnston’s argument fails. 
Johnston’s is the only theory of a surviving supervening or (epi-) 
phenomenal self/person/“I” that I am aware of, but if there are others, those 
                                           
12 This would imply that – if the second reason would be ignored – a psychopath (or someone with 
another anti-empathic disorder) would not feel future concern for the post-treatment person, which 
would be interesting (but difficult) to test. 
13 I doubt this, actually. It seems to me that when someone says to imagine to be someone else, what 
they really imagine is to be themselves in the other’s position. And for the same reason that one cannot 
imagine not to be, one cannot imagine not to be what one actually is (i.e. someone else). 
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would face some of the same problems. An (epi-) phenomenal self can only 
survive bodily death if it supervenes, or is existentially dependent on some other 
material being(s) that survive. Aside from the aforementioned science fiction 
story of copying minds to computers or robots (see section 1), the only option is 
(re-) identification of the self/person with something that survives. Such (re-) 
identification, however, would imply psychological discontinuity as there is no 
thing (other than myself) that I can (re-) identify with and that is psychologically 
continuous with me-now. In other words, the idea of a supervening survivor – 
that is, option [2a''] in section 2 – requires giving up the personal identity 
criterion of psychological continuity. That, however, is deeply problematic, as 
none of the “alternatives” for this criterion work. There are no self-defining 
essences (see previous section), and certainly none that I (could) share with 
something I could (re-) identify with;
14
 Johnston’s “radical reversal” fails, and 
therefore, so does the dispositional theory; and the only remaining option would 
be to deny personal identity over time altogether, but that would preclude 
survival in any form. We can conclude, therefore, that option [2a''] turns out not 
be an option at all, and as [2a''] was the last straw for strategy 1, it follows that 
there is no viable strategy 1 denial of death. 
 
5. Does Buddhism Follow Strategy 2? 
 
Unlike Johnston, Buddhism offers no escape,
15
 but opts for the more 
difficult path of denying the “I” (i.e. the self or person, the dying subject). 
Suffering (dukkha) originates in attachment to impermanent and/or 
conventional/phenomenal (i.e. not “ultimately” real) “things”, and a full 
realization thereof (through study/“wisdom” and meditation) dissolves (or 
alleviates) suffering. By fully realizing that the self/person is merely a 
“convenient designator” and is not ultimately real, one can overcome attachment 
and thus fear.  
This is, of course, an oversimplification, but for the present purpose it offers 
a sufficiently accurate sketch of the essential idea, I think. To assess that idea (as 
a possible example of strategy 2), we need to look into the question: What do I 
                                           
14 The impossibility of such re-identification becomes especially apparent if one takes into account 
that (the relevant kind of) identity is either complete or completely lacking. There is no middle way 
when it comes to the question “Will it be me?” Either it is (or will be) me, or it isn’t. (See Stokes 
2013.) There is nothing available for such absolute, unambiguous, and doubt-free re-identification. 
15 Reincarnation is not an escape. See footnote 4. 
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fear in fearing death? 
The fear of my death is not a fear of losing some kind of thing, it does not 
imply an attachment or clinging to some self-defining essence – even if I would 
believe that I have such an essence. Rather, the fear of my death is the fear of the 
termination of my stream of experience, of my psychological continuity and 
connectedness, of discontinuity. It is continuity I crave, not essence.
16
 But if I’m 
not clinging to a self-defining essence anyway, then what does the rejection 
thereof matter? And why would it matter that what I am clinging to, continuity, 
is classified as “conventional” (or “phenomenal” in Kantian/Western terms)? 
The answer to the latter question is that something merely 
conventional/phenomenal is inherently impermanent and therefore will be lost, 
and that is the source of suffering. In more schematic form: 
 
[B1] The self is mere convenient designator and not ultimately real. (Or: there 
is no ultimately real self-defining essence, but selves/persons are 
phenomenal/conventional.) 
[B2] Clinging to a convenient designator (etc.) will lead to suffering. (Because 
it is impermanent and not ultimately real, and therefore, will be lost.) 
[B3] Clinging to the self will lead to suffering. Therefore, to end (this kind of) 
suffering, one needs to overcome clinging to the self.
17
 
 
While this is perfectly valid, it does not answer the question why the rejection of 
a self-defining essence would matter. What the argument claims, in short, is that 
to stop craving for continuity eliminates the fear for discontinuity, but that is 
obvious – it is just a more sophisticated (or more obscure?) way of 
recommending to give up the fear of death by not caring too much about one’s 
own life.
18
 Although that may be sound therapeutic advise (or not – I’ll leave 
                                           
16 Even if I would crave essence, I would only do so because that essence might guarantee continuity. 
In other words, essence would be mere means to an end, and that end is continuity. 
17 Meditational practice is an essential component hereof. In meditation – at least the here relevant 
kind thereof – the practitioner observes oneself more or less like a third person, leading ultimately to a 
lessening or even dissolution of the attachment to oneself. For a useful explanation of the role and 
nature of meditation, see Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson (2007). 
18 Although this is not a necessary part of the main argument, there seems to be a common 
assumption that the status reduction (from ultimately real to mere phenomenon, etc.) of the self/person 
matters. If I understand this secondary argument correctly, it is an enthymeme in which the second 
premise is hidden: [1] The self is mere convenient designator and not ultimately real. [2] Whatever is 
mere convenient designator and not ultimately real is not worth clinging to. [3] The self is not worth 
clinging to. This is obviously valid, but has a second (hidden) premise that is quite implausible. Rather, 
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that aside), the question remains how denying the “I” matters therein. It seems to 
me that it doesn’t, or not in any relevant sense, at least: the “I” denied is not the 
“I” clung to. But if that is right, then Buddhism turns out not to advocate 
strategy 2 at all. 
Remember that strategy 2 claims that [S2]: ∃¬    x [x is me]. Buddhism, 
∃however, has a more specific claim: ¬   x [x is ultimately real ∧ x is me]. That is, 
it denies the existence of the self/person at some level of reality, but not at 
∃another:   x [x is conventionally real ∧ x is me ]. And that conventionally real 
self will cease to be: 
 
[DB] ∀ x [ x is me → ( x is conventionally real ∧ x will cease to be ) ] ∧ 
 ∃  x [ x is me ] ,19 
 
but [DB] is a variant of [D], not its negation. Consequently, Buddhism does not 
deny death, it merely offers therapy (instead of a painkiller). 
If what seemed to be the most likely candidate for an example of strategy 2 
turns out not to advocate strategy 2 at all, one may wonder whether it is even 
possible to coherently assert [S2]. Descartes’s famous claim that “I think, 
therefore I am” seems to contradict [S2], but the cogito has been subjected to 
criticism in recent decades. The key to the issue is in the quantifiers in [D] and 
its two negations [S1] and [S2]. No domain was specified, but any quantifier – 
by definition – has a domain. The question, therefore, that needs an answer, is: 
What is the domain of the quantifiers in [D] and its negations? 
No restrictions are assumed or suggested in the natural language sentences 
that [D] is a formalization of. Rather, the domain must include everything that 
could be a possible candidate for the second conjunct in [D]: x is me. In other 
words, if I (specifically, the “I” that I am attached to) could possibly be a useful 
fiction (Dennett) or a convenient designator (Buddhism) or something else not 
considered “real” in a restrictive, materialist sense, then those options must be in 
the domain of the quantifiers as well. Since no restriction is implied, it seems 
                                                                                                                                   
I’m inclined to say that everything that is worth clinging to (i.e. everything of value) is 
phenomenal/conventional. Love, happiness, beauty, and so forth are not ultimately real, but “mere” 
phenomena. As mentioned, however, the value/worth of phenomena plays no role in the main 
argument. 
19 [DB] results from ∀eliminating the redundancies in the longer formula  x [ x is me → ( ¬ ( x is 
ultimately real ) ∧ x will cease to be ) ] ∧ ∃  x [ x is me ∧ x is conventionally real ], which follows 
from the above considerations. The predicates “is conventionally real” and “is ultimately real” are 
mutually exclusive. 
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that the quantifiers in [D] must be absolutely unrestricted, but what “absolute 
unrestriction” means and whether this is possible is a controversial topic within 
meta-ontology and philosophy of logic. Root of the controversy is the fact that 
because of Russell’s paradox, the notion of an absolutely universal set is 
incoherent. The quantifiers in [D] do not need to range over absolutely 
everything in that sense, however, just over everything that possibly can be 
quantified over. 
The domain of a restricted quantifier is a subset of that of a relatively 
“unrestricted” quantifier. Conversely, if “expansion” is the opposite of 
restriction, then the domain of an expanded quantifier is a superset of that of 
some restricted quantifier. “Absolutely unrestricted” then, can be coherently 
understood to mean “maximally expanded”: the domain of an absolutely 
unrestricted / maximally expanded quantifier is the superset of all other domains, 
the set of all things that can be quantified over.
20
 That (as mentioned) is the 
intended domain of [D]. And by implication, there is no incoherency in the 
implicit domains of [D] and its negations. 
Understanding the quantifiers in this sense means that there is no argument 
against the cogito. Any such argument depends on a restriction of the quantifier, 
but lacking restriction, the cogito is undeniable: I think, therefore I am, at least 
in some sense (as a convenient designator for the “arena” of the thinking that is 
going on, for example). It is for the same reason that [S2] cannot be coherently 
asserted. [S2] denies that there is a self/person/“me” in any (relevant) sense, but 
that is nonsense: even if the self is an illusion, it exists as an illusion and thus in 
some sense (and if it is that illusory self that I am attached to, then it exists in a 
relevant sense). In other words, it is not just the case that Buddhism does not 
exemplify strategy 2, there is no strategy 2 (or at least no coherent strategy 2). 
What seemed to be strategy 2 then, is not strictly speaking a denial of the “I” or 
self either, but merely a denial of the exalted status thereof. Rather than denying 
the self, it desecrates or dissolves it. 
 
6. An Unavoidable Incoherence 
 
Sections 2 and 4 rejected strategy 1, section 5 refuted strategy 2, and there is 
                                           
20 See Rayo & Uzquiano (eds.) (2006) for a collection of papers on the possibility of absolute 
unrestriction. My suggestion of maximally expanded quantifiers is partly based on Kit Fine’s paper in 
that book and further developed in Brons (2013). 
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nothing left: with [S1] and [S2] off the table, there is no coherent negation of 
[D]. The denial of death is incoherent.
21
 Denial, however, is not the only way of 
coping with death, as the discussion of Buddhism illustrated, and because 
“self-dissolution therapy” (as an alternative to denial as “painkiller” or 
“anxiolytic”) is inseparable from what seemed to be strategy 2, at least some 
attention needs to be paid to that option. However, I do not consider myself 
competent to judge the effectiveness of Buddhism as therapy, nor do I want to, 
but there is a closely related suggestion that I want to comment on: Derek 
Parfit’s. 
Like Buddhism, Parfit (1984) rejects self-defining essences (see section 3), 
but the therapeutic effect of the realization thereof is considerably more modest 
than overcoming suffering. He writes that he finds the dissolution of the self 
“liberating, and consoling” (p. 281), and that: 
 
My life seemed like a glass tunnel (...). When I changed my view, the 
walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is 
still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the 
difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the 
rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others. (p. 281) 
 
Underlying Parfit’s consoling dispersal of concern is (of course) not the 
strict (and incoherent) self-denial of [S2], but the aforementioned status 
reduction of the self: self-desecration or self-dissolution. This idea and its fallout 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
[T1] There are no self-defining essences. 
[T2] (from T1) Personal identity through time depends on psychological 
continuity and connectedness. 
[T3] (from T2) The boundary between me and you is not much sharper or more 
fundamental than that between me-now and me-then. 
[T4] Realizing [T3] reduces the (subjective, experienced) distance between me 
and you, between self and others.  
 
                                           
21 “Incoherence” may seem too strong, but if [S2] is incoherent (as argued in section 5) and [S1] is 
incoherent with everything we know (i.e. externally incoherent), then denying [D] is incoherent 
indeed. 
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[T1] and [T2] were discussed in section 3, [T3] does seem to follow from 
[T2] (although this might need some additional support), and [T4] seems 
plausible as well. What I fail so see, however, is how [T4] is “liberating” or 
“consoling”. If there no longer is a fundamental difference between me and you, 
then neither is there a fundamental difference between my fear, my suffering, 
and yours. Rather than to console or comfort, this multiplies the fear and 
suffering: no longer do I just fear my death, my pain, my suffering, but yours too. 
Of course, this may still work in repressing one’s fear of death in the same way 
that hitting one’s finger with a hammer would be an effective way to forget 
about a tooth pain; or perhaps the experience of suffering (etc.) becomes so 
intolerable, so overwhelming that one starts to desire one’s own death rather 
than fear it; but those are hardly the kind of therapeutic effects a patient would 
hope for. 
There are then, at least two plausible “therapeutic” scenario’s associated 
with the self-dissolution thesis summarized in [T1] to [T4]; that is, two varieties 
of what would be [T5]: Parfit’s consoling suffering/fear [TC] scenario, and my 
multiplying suffering/fear [TM] scenario. 
 
[TC] Weakening the boundary between self and others makes my death less 
subjectively important when others live. 
[TM] Weakening the boundary between self and others also weakens the 
subjective (experienced) boundary between my and others’ suffering. 
 
Most likely this does not exhaust the options, and perhaps, they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive either. Furthermore, both [TC] and [TM] are 
based on anecdotal “evidence” only – [TC] more or less describes Parfit’s 
experience, while [TM] is closer to mine
22
 – and are, therefore, probably just 
                                           
22 James Baillie (2013) recently tried to explain the cognitive/epistemic difference between the 
abstract knowledge that one will eventually die like everyone else and a full realization of that fact. 
The full realization, which he calls the “terror of death”, was for him a shocking (even traumatizing) 
and life-changing experience. The terror of death (in that sense) is nothing like the “normal” fear of 
death, and neither is it anything like the adrenaline rush one feels when doing something stupid 
enough to almost die. It is an intense and paralyzing sense of panic. It hurts. It screams. It leaves no 
room for positive reinterpretation or romantic glorification. Like Baillie, I have experienced some 
form of the “terror of death” (and the description of the experience in the last sentences is mine, not 
his). My experience is not completely identical to Baillie’s, however. Perhaps, the most significant 
difference in the present context is that I do not just experience the terror of my death, but sometimes 
that of others as well. What I felt when I fully realized the absolute inescapability of my death, I feel 
again – especially when caught off-guard – in quite similar intensity every time I read, hear, or see true 
stories about people facing impending and inescapable death. Undoubtedly, what I feel is nothing 
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two points on a field or spectrum of possible outcomes of [T4].  
Although not formally death-denying, some of these possible outcomes may 
be very similar effectively. Particularly, it seems to me that [TC] is a 
watered-down version of strategy 1. [TC] makes sense only if one is still 
primarily concerned with one’s own death, if (the lives of) others are mere 
means to shift the focus away from one’s own death to the promise of continuing 
life, thus enabling neglect of one’s own death, drugging fear back into slumber. 
[TC] depends on the substitution of neglect for denial, which may be clearly 
distinct logically but which are far less different psychologically; or even on an 
implicit and nebulous idea of some kind of survival as/in the lives of others (i.e. 
strategy 1; [TC] is rather similar to Johnston’s version of strategy 1 in this 
respect; see section 4). 
More important than the consistency of [TC], however, is the feasibility of 
any kind of “self-dissolution therapy” as an alternative to denying death. 
Self-dissolution itself conflicts with a psychological need of self-affirmation and 
protection of self-integrity and identity (e.g. Sherman & Cohen 2006). According 
to Ernest Becker (1973) and Terror Management Theory, which is partly based on 
his work, death denial and this psychological need of self-affirmation are even 
connected. “Self-dissolution therapy” then, would not only have to suppress one 
psychological need, death denial, but would have to do so by suppressing another, 
self-affirmation, as well. Moreover, the results of such therapy may not seem 
obviously attractive to everyone. Regardless of the desirability of [TM] from a 
third-person point of view, it is not unlikely that for many people it is not an 
acceptable alternative to the consoling effects of denial, and thus not an 
alternative at all. But if this is the case, then the apparently only alternative for 
denying death is not (universally) a real alternative. It asks too much for too little; 
it is too difficult (requiring the suppression of two psychological needs rather than 
just one), and does not have certain and obviously desirable results. And lacking a 
(real) alternative, the denial of death – at least as a social phenomenon – is 
unavoidable.
23
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
compared to the panic they felt, but it hurts and screams nevertheless. The “hammer vs. tooth pain” 
variant of [TM], is not an imaginary scenario: it describes my experience. There is nothing “liberating” 
or “consoling” about it. (But I never asked to be consoled anyway.) 
23 Of course, this does not deny the possibility in individual cases, but merely that “therapy” is not an 
alternative on a social scale. It is most likely also for this reason that the main lay forms of Buddhism 
in East Asia, variants of popular Pure Land Buddhism, have diverted from the Buddhist 
self-dissolution path to a version of strategy 1: the promise of an afterlife in the “Pure Land”. 
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7. Epilogue: What/Why Does It Matter? 
 
Western philosophy started more than two millennia ago with theoretical 
reflections on relatively practical concerns (and arguably, the same is true for 
Indian and Chinese philosophy). For Plato, for example, those where ethical 
concerns: How to live well? The increase of specialization has made it 
increasingly uncommon to return from deeper, more fundamental, and more 
technical questions to what once motivated them, especially in analytic 
philosophy. This is an understandable, but also somewhat unfortunate 
development as one may wonder what justifies debating philosophical problems 
that have no (direct or indirect) relevance for what matters to people whatsoever.   
My argument in this paper probably matters in different ways (or at least, I 
think so), but what I am most concerned about is ethics and social philosophy. I 
do not (necessarily) want to deny people their “painkiller”, but I am worried 
about the “side effects”. Some of these side effects are obvious or have been 
discussed before. Becker (1973), for example, pointed out that theories of death 
denial compete. If my control over my fear of death depends on certain beliefs, 
then any beliefs that contradict those are a direct threat to that control. If I am a 
Christian, then the mere existence of a Muslim is a threat to my coping with the 
fear of death, and vice versa. And since I (psychologically) need to control that 
fear, the mere existence of that Muslim is a threat to me. 
An obvious moral implication of the untenability of death denial is that the 
promise of an afterlife (i.e. strategy 1) the quality of which is dependent on one’s 
actions in this life is immoral as it requests people to “sacrifice” their only life 
for a reward that does not exist.
24
 Such a promise of an afterlife is “ideology” in 
the Marxian sense of that term: it promotes the interest of the ruling class by 
promising the masses a better afterlife if they meekly accept their lot and follow 
the rules (that are set by that ruling class in its own interest).
25
 Perhaps, equally 
obvious is that denying death devalues life: if death is not such a “big thing” 
because either one does not really die (strategy 1) or one does not really exist 
anyway (strategy 2), then ending a life is a rather minor incident. On the other 
                                           
24 On the other hand, there is the ancient worry that if death “treats” the good and the evil equally, this 
would undermine all morality. 
25 Extending this point, if all suffering is of equal importance, then all ideologies that request some to 
“sacrifice” their life, their happiness for the sake of others are (equally?) immoral. This applies 
especially to Utopian ideologies that promise the good in the more or less distant future (or “the long 
run”) such as socialism and mainstream economics. 
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hand, if death is undeniable and absolute, so is the value of life. 
Arguments like these may seem to suggest that the denial of death is 
immoral, and therefore, that (death-denying) religion is immoral, but that is too 
easy. If cruelty is always immoral, then (intentionally) taking away someone’s 
“painkiller” without offering an acceptable alternative is immoral as well (and 
note that it was argued in section 6 that “self-dissolution therapy” may not be an 
acceptable alternative). Hence, even if (death-denying) religion is morally 
wrong, so is aggressive atheism. Furthermore, it is hard to see anything morally 
wrong in the actions of a priest (or imam, shaman, etc.) who spends great effort 
consoling those in need, and who does little to spread or enforce some 
life-devaluing or sacrifice-requiring set of rules.
26
 The real problem then, is not 
so much in determining and substantiating the various moral implications of the 
incoherence (and unavoidability) of the denial of death, but in figuring out the 
(or a) right balance. I have no clue how to do that. Yet, I can hardly think of a 
more important and more urgent problem for philosophy. 
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